The Formation Quest & Government
The Supreme Court within the Moral Judicial Branch
In brief, the Moral Supreme Court...
  would provide for the primary rights of all enfranchised citizens within a moral democracy socially to access their government individually as its logical plaintiffs if they'd socially contracted first from within that logic for which our humanly-common source hierarchically provides the a priori assumptions. It's also then that the supreme court which would hear their complaints wouldn't require the logical defendant which a trial within the trial court would because the plaintiff wouldn't hold any individual human to judgment. As for the appellate court, they'd hold the language-analogous law to judgment instead, but there's uniquely would be that of their nation-state's constitution which they'd allege to vary from the authority within that moral source.
  The logical plaintiff would retain her or his private rights to do so even if she or he otherwise employs within the public sector. That she or he also had chosen to become political and a secondary custodian of everyone's equally-applied rights otherwise standardizably wouldn't abrogate her or his primary individual right socially also to enjoy the equal application of those rights. Logically for them to apply, she or he also could bring others as counsel and witnesses into the hearing while none within the interest group personally could claim or invoke the moral authority of their public-sector purposes otherwise. She or he alternatively also could have such another appear in her or his stead as a stand-in logical plaintiff. Thusly, only there and then could a true "moral majority" of all the people institute from without morally to retain their collective authority to be the primary custodians of their inclusive social contract even while they'd delegate some among themselves secondarily to vest with custodially-purposeful authority within the legislative, executive and judicial branches on an occasional or continuing basis.
  It's then that only the commonly-meaningful application of analogous laws is in question where and when only the people equally as primary custodians ultimately can initiate socially-common constitutional changes from outside the judicial system by utilizing the executive offices of the legal service's elections division. Given that no individual initially stands to judgment, the elected judges would replace trial jurors judgmentally to render these applications within the hearing because their own custodial duty would be to uphold the rule of moral law and not judge particular individuals through its authority. Their logical number standardizes to be three because then they'd represent the society rather than a single individual where and when the plurality of a moral majority democratically still would apply among themselves. That is, any socially-instituted judgment morally requires a democratic means if politically it would affect our primary individual rights. Moreover, that number morally next accords better than larger ones because it more-greatly reduces the greater society's demand upon its resources. 
  Other standards would apply to admit those who could or must audit, transcribe from and provide policing within the hearing itself as well as publicize it without. They'd also determine the administrative law which would accord for and to all its participants. That law standardizes as it does within the trial court with two major variations. First, the three judges must vote one of themselves to be the lead spokesperson and personnel manager for all because the moral rule of law itself doesn't fail if one individual truly is a personnel manager only. It even supports a more-just outcome because the outcomes politically achieved alternative to this democratic one either immorally would be undemocratic or would permit a disorder within which other's rights more likely wouldn't accord. The second permits everyone equally to participate as only a trial's jurors would because any changes in analogous law commonly affects them while the fate of an individual defendant wouldn't. Therefore, all would have the primary right to question and argue positions as the jurors otherwise would, even while a moral majority of the judges assume the jurors' other duty to make the ultimate judgment.
  A constitutional statement to be judged also may have originated the "charge" partially from the application of which jurors had judged individuals. Overturning it morally then standardizes the "class-action" basis for actions by the "guilty" who next could become logical plaintiffs themselves. As handled through the trial court, they could request exoneration and must be exonerated if the original plaintiffs or- if the latter are deceased or unenfranchised- their stand-ins wouldn't prosecute. If they would, each of the affected new plaintiffs next must name an individual or, serially, individuals who by recourse to the original charge effected his or her adverse judgment within the earlier trial. His or her own charge specifically also would standardize within the statute law to be "civil" rather than "criminal," one either first framed by the legislature or as inferred directly from the constitution to apply. Only there and then could there be an equal application of the inclusive law through that law where and when all socially would play by the same rules on a level playing field.
  If overturned, the contested language next would move to legal services for possible removal from the constitution after a referendum vote of the people. Directly or as personnel managers, the judges would see to this through the coordination of the supreme court's clerical and media personnel with their expertized counterparts within the executive branch. Regardless of the outcome, the same would apply with regard to those within that other branch's division of ownership records.
  Thus, these custodial humans as individuals would coordinate under the rule of that moral law which standardizes to converge upon that coordinate end. It logically would  where and when a true moral majority of the people immorally even could change their constitution to have it otherwise. That is, no classified corpus of the analogous law- not even coordinately that of the constitutionally "highest-" is immune from the authority of those who apply their law ignorantly within or dedicatedly from our human source. In sum, even that source commonly to which we could refer rationally only describes what has been, is and could be. It doesn't prescribe what should be or proscribe what shouldn't. Only we individually can do that by implementing its truths and facts hierarchically as they apply to our kind socially in common. It's morally then that we even can be immoral by acting unethically from within its descriptive applications- amorally so if we're political and formatively ignorant and immorally so if we're political and formatively aware of but not dedicated fully to implementing its logic
  It's now that you, too, can know this along with this writer who is but a fallible individual and messenger for that which at least could make you formatively aware. You also can know our kind to have been formatively ignorant and politically amoral even while recognizing the humanly-common formative fact which is our "essential ignorance" of the rational facts we otherwise only could describe roughly in their  sensibly and expatiatedly-differing particulars between us. There and then, this applies to mean that they- perhaps you?- fully aren't culpable for their crimes even of commission. You'd also realize that our politically-instituted supreme court justices and their counterparts amorally and unethically have ruled as men from top down where and when, at best, they've interpreted our constitutions variably and divisively as best they could- that we've been their subordinates politically as well. 
  There and then, you even could choose to become formatively dedicated—choose socially to act in moral defense—in moral civil disobedience if needed. Such a defense and disobedience are moral of course because they do form to respect the equally applied rights of all even otherwise to submit to our unknowingly amoral tyrants. Regardless of where and when each of us does "draw the line," we must reform the social contracts which would have us swear our allegiances to our constitutions and/or human dictators as well as the countries which always have standardized the presence of both. At least we must if we'd form that first morally-exemplary nation-state which could lead to our becoming the moral as well as- with rational limitations- sovereign species.

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Last modified on October 21, 1999