the Moral Legislative Branch...
a politically-purposeful interest group within the public sector
of government. Its elected and expertized members would coordinate among
themselves and with their counterparts within the executive and
judicial branches. All would have custody of a moral social
contract which commonly originates from the human's condition. The
authority of this formative source then would vest in the
of a constitution within and through which all enfranchised citizens first
and last would govern morally from that formative basis or not.
they would, they individually could participate politically within a moral
democracy or not, electing some of their instituted custodians within
the legislative and other branches of the public sector.
It's then that the formative logic socially would apply to
standardize legislative-branch individuals collectively to form one moral
interest group with custodial purposes first forming from the right of
a true "moral majority"of all the people immorally even to change the word-enabled
legal conditions of their social contract.
all the people remain dedicated to the human source which
includes the formative truths and facts which hierarchically apply through
its logic to explain and enable even our ability to act otherwise,
the legislature would have little to do. Yet even there and then, the constitution
would be of a language written and known by imperfect humans.
Legislators as equally-enfranchised citizens also could initiate
changes to it through referendafor better or worse. They'd also do so
services within the executive branch.
related problems with and within language as the analogue of the
sensibly knowable apart, the logical application yet admits
to the formative fact of our essential ignorance ultimately of all
sensible particulars, and this alone sanctions our legislators custodially
with moral purpose. That is, they must codify laws which more particularly
apply constitutional precepts given that the people whose rightful needs
they morally must meet couldn't easily apply them themselves and bear the
primary right to know
social consequences of their acts before enacting them.
particular conditions for this standardize clearly to include four classifications
of law, the administrative, regulatory, civil and criminal. The administrative
includes their own "in-house" activities "in session." These are the "rules"
by which they'd hear, discuss and pass statute laws, those
civil and criminal laws which logical plaintiffs may cite and file to be
standardized "charges" against a defendant within a trial which
trial court within the judicial branch
would conduct. The civil law also may include the administrative laws pertaining
to other political interest groups whose members first wouldn't supply
own administrative law would abide moral standards. One follows from
their need to open their sessions to the people who also directly could
bespeak their own beliefs. Another also follows from the primary
rights of the people as that converges with the moral rule of law rather
than men. It applies to require legislators to "sit on" revolving committees
where and when all legislators first must audit other public-sector
interest groups before they'd return to report within a meeting of the
"committee of the whole" in open session. So abiding, they'd better be
able to codify law based particularly more on everyone's needs within the
standardized "official-to-official" and "official-to-citizen" transactions
they'd witness and participate in.
legislature would codify two types of regulatory law. One apportions
resources among all moral interest groups. The constitution first
would authorize this with the public and private sectors
having equal shares which they'd next specify to include access to the
electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunications, say. The other
protects the citizen-consumer's primary rights by requiring themselves
to specify the duties of political custodians to them. It's these which
those within the business and professional regulation
division within the executive branch better could enforce
as also to reduce the number of logical plaintiffs at the
political interface of both custodial sectors.
law then would include statutes which logical plaintiffs could
use to prosecute their socially-instituted political custodians for a standardized
"nonfeasance," "misfeasance" and "malfeasance" by reference to the analogous
laws they'd otherwise apply differently. Therefore, only political custodians
within the social sectors civilly could be judged and only then for denying
another's primary right secondarily to participate politically within their
social contract. This prosecution of the person next then would take place
within the moral trial of the trial court as
distinct from challenges of the laws themselves which would involve the
appellate court within the judicial branch
of criminal law similarly would follow to prohibit any individual from
acting physically to exclude another of her or his primary rights.
These rights preeminently are to person or personal property and socially
to participate politically. If another ordered an excluding individual
so to act, she or he arguably also ruled as a man and not from moral law.
Therefore, she or he also stands to charges under the criminal statutes.
This standardizes to apply both domestically and internationally and to
individuals with or without instituted political authority.
sum, legislators would act in and out of session to obtain input from logical
themselves equally included. We'd delegate them the politically-purposeful
authority only to codify analogous beliefs as law given that the other
interest groups within a moral social contract ethically
also would transact on a level playing field. Therefore, they'd only enact
such laws as individuals would require if those individuals first couldn't
infer their applications from the constitution otherwise. Only there and
then, would the individual's formatively-prior right clearly to know
the rules of the political "game" in advance morally accord equally to
all at all.