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The Formation Quest & Society
The Moral Judicial Branch
within the Moral Social Contract

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In brief, the Moral Judicial Branch...
  politically would be a purposeful interest group within the public sector of government. Its elected and expertized members would coordinate among themselves and with their counterparts within the executive and legislative branches. All would have custody of a moral social contract which commonly originates from the human's condition. The authority of this formative source then would vest in the language of a constitution within and through which all enfranchised citizens first and last would govern morally from that formative basis or not.
  If they would, they individually could participate politically within a moral democracy or not, electing some of their instituted custodians within the judicial and other branches of the public sector. It's then that the formative logic socially would apply to standardize judicial-branch individuals collectively to form one moral interest group with custodial purposes first forming from the right of a true "moral majority"of all the people immorally even to change the word-enabled legal conditions of their social contract. It's also then that anyone's fully-optioned private acts- as in producing children or taking the property or life of another, say- can have consequents which the judiciary also must consider in order to judge the standardized "governors by consequence" for their political acts.
  The enfranchised people generally as citizens politically also could- and some must- also institute within a moral judiciary's trials of those who politically do govern by consequence or as themselves instituted with custodial authority. Morally conducting these trials is among the judiciary's socially-instituted purposes, one which would exist within a trial court. Other purposes would apply to and for its other two divisions, namely an appellate and supreme court. All require language, that of the formative truths and facts constitutionally foremost, to apply to transactions of and from the rational facts of a case with a logical plaintiff and the use of the formative logic judgmental givens.
  There'd be no prosecutable crimes against or for an amorphous "state," only against individuals by individuals because there is no standardized "crime" within the analogous formation of any words- including those of the "state," "national interest," and "national security, say. Yet another's language instrumentally may be the medium through which a standardized "criminal" enacts a crime. It's then that only the actions of criminals who'd interpret legal or other words or prescriptively direct others through them can be crimes. A crime therefore forms most simply and surely to be a consequent of the enactor's non-language act. More tenuously, it also can apply to a specifically-enacted expression of language or- within body language- a gestural act which rationally either directs another to act criminally or makes one criminal oneself.
  Regardless, it's the sensibly-validated exclusion of another's rights which standardizes a "crime" as the moral legislature more specifically may cover it "civilly" or "criminally" under the statute law. It's then that neither the inferable "intent" to commit a crime nor the "conspiracy"attributed to an interest group with that intent sustains judicial action in itself. Please also note that morally-formed "restraining orders," against "stalkers," say, still could protect possible victims otherwise within the trial court but not its trials of an individual for a crime.
  Other moral standards for judging the individual within trials devolve. If he or she acted alone or was directed, the charges may range from  relatively-mild civil charges to criminal "murder." If directing, his or her words have to be explicit by reference to the crime. If his or her words would protect another, the other must be a convicted criminal. There and then, the former standardizes him or her to be an "accomplice before the fact to [whatever]" and the latter "after the fact." Finally, if he or she alone is criminal through language-analogous acts, the charges could range from "disturbing the peace" to "murder" given the severity of the consequences for others. For instance, this applies if one willfully and knowingly yells "fire" (or anything else, for that matter) in a theater (or any other co-occupied place.)
  The language of the law frames the standardized "charge" which would apply to the individual who stands to a standard of  "analogous judgment" within the trial, and this distinguishes from the standardized "personal judgment" which the coordinating police within the executive branch effect. It also differs from the logical plaintiff's challenge of that language directly within the appellate court. That court would consider trial appeals only of that charge as it affects all possible defendants or would bypass the trial court completely to rule on a logical plaintiff's challenge of any instituted law or an unenfranchised plaintiff's petition for enfranchisement. Finally, the supreme court only would consider challenges to the constitution's language as problematically it logically doesn't follow from our formative source.
  Thus the supreme court's politically-instituted purpose would be to clarify the imperfect language from imperfect humans as to what otherwise humanly is common to us, and that positively could redound throughout the court system and society. The people generally also could change all laws even also to diverge from the underlying moral imperative. They also could change the constitution even if they'd truly first standardize to be "moral majority" truly within a moral democracy. That they- like their custodians- then might not be acting morally would be a sad fact, but that morally forms to be their ultimate choice anyway, either by their initiation or quiescence.
  Judges within all three divisions would be elected, their only qualification to be their enfranchised citizenship. There and then, they'd truly be equal with those they'd custodially only manage in judgment. They'd not be lawyers as now they immorally must be within many of our social contracts, our individual alternative either to acquiesce or rebel in moral civil disobedience. Even through our word-conceptual knowledge, it's patently illogical to believe we have the "rule of law" given that only our expertized lawyers even could know enough about what they create and argue over to apply it from top down for and upon those of us who presumably can't. Yet to add injury to insult, these same "authorities" also tell us that "ignorance of the [their] law is of no avail."
  It finally also follows that our socially-instituted judges must honor everyone's primary private right to know the social consequences others politically would impose upon himself or herself before she or he acts. Only there and then, could she or he interact with others equally through standardized applications of "prior consent" and "informed choice." A judiciary ethically must honor this in the moral defense equally of all if itself it politically would institute morally with social authority. 


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Last modified on October 5, 1999